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STATE OF UTAH 
E A R L A. J O H N S O N , d/b/a 
A L B E T H COMPANY and 
B E T H J O H N S O N , his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ROCKING O' H O R S E T R A I L E R S , 
INC., and A N N F . OLSEN, et. al, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
R E S P O N D E N T S ' B R I E F 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiffs to quiet title to 
property which they occupy in American Fork, Utah 
County, State of Utah, in which Defendants claim an 
interest. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The District Court granted Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment based upon facts stipulated at the 
I Case No. 
> 
13508 
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hearing of said Motion and upon affidavits and plead-
ings of record. From the Judgment for the Plaintiffs 
the Defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request this Court affirm the Judg-
ment of the District Court. 
S T A T E M E N T S O F F A C T S 
On August 14, 1963, Lamar C. Clark and Georg-
ina Clark, his wife, were record owners of the property 
which is the subject of this lawsuit. On the above date 
they entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract selling 
said property to Ron E. Olsen and Ann F . Olsen (R-
62) (TR-8). Because of financial difficulty, an arrange-
ment was made between the Clarks and the Olsens, 
whereby the above mentioned contract was terminated 
and a new Uniform Real Estate contract dated Novem-
ber 10, 1966 was entered into wherein the Clarks con-
tracted to sell the subject property to Rocking 'O' 
Horse Trailers, Inc. (R-64) (TR-9). 
Shortly after this contract was entered into, the 
Internal Revenue Service issued a levy and attached 
the subject property. On January 30, 1967 Rocking 
0 ' Horse Trailers, Inc. filed a petition in Bankruptcy 
and on March 3, 1967, a trustee was appointed. (TR-4 
R-50). On the 17th day of May 1967, the trustee and 
the Internal Revenue Service entered into an agreement 
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whereby the subject property, which had been attached 
by the Internal Revenue Service, was put into posses-
sion of the Trustee (TR-4 R-80). The trustee failed to 
sell the subject property and on the 1st day of May, 
1968 petitioned the court to allow the trustee to "give 
back" the property to the Internal Revenue Service 
(R-80). The Court granted the petition and ordered 
that the subject property, 
be returned to the United States of America 
and the Internal Revenue Service by the Trus-
tee and the Trustee is hereby relieved from any 
further responsibility pertaining to said prop-
erty, and he is authorized to execute all docu-
ments necessary, if any, to make the transfer 
as herein provided. (R-83) 
On or about the 21st day of June, 1968, the bank-
ruptcy proceedings involving Rocking O' Horse 
Trailers, Inc. were terminated by the court discharging 
said corporation as bankrupt. (R-110) 
On or about the 12th day of November, 1968, the 
Internal Revenue Service offered the subject property 
for sale by sealed bid. The respondents were the high 
bidders and the Internal Revenue Service informed 
the respondents that they were the purchasers of the 
property. Pursuant to said sale, the respondents entered 
into possession of the property in question and have 
remained in possession since the time of said sale to the 
present date. (R-109-110) 
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Some time later the Internal Revenue Service 
rescinded the sale and tendered the respondents their 
purchase money (TR-12). 
The respondents then obtained a quit claim deed 
and an assignment of the seller's interest in the Novem-
ber 10, 1966, Uniform Real Estate Contract from 
Georgina Clark. (Her husband having passed away 
in the interim) (TR-13). 
Shortly after the respondents entered into posses-
sion of the property, Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, Inc., 
learned that the sale to the respondents by the Internal 
Revenue Service had been rescinded (R-108) but made 
no contact with the respondents to dispute their title 
or possession to the subject property (R-47, 75). 
On December 17, 1969, the defunct (its charter 
having been revoked on March 29, 1968), bankrupt, 
(its discharge having been granted) corporation, at-
tempted to convey the subject property to the appellant 
Ann F . Olsen (R-67). On the 17th day of January, 
1973, the respondents filed this action to quiet title, 
and on or about the 15th day of February, 1973, for 
the first time since September of 1968 (TR-12) the 
appellant Ann F . Olsen tendered a payment to the 
respondents (R-109). 
Respondents remained in possession of the prop-
erty and paid the taxes thereon for a period in excess 
of five years during which time the appellants made no 
effort to contact respondents right of occupancy nor 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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did appellant tender any payment to either the respon-
dents or Georgina Clark, respondents grantor, (TR-12, 
R-110, R-75, R-47) but remained silent and allowed 
the respondents to make substantial improvements upon 
the premises. (R-47). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
A P P E L L A N T A N N F . O L S E N S T E N -
D E R M A D E IN P A Y M E N T OF T H E 
CONTRACT W A S I N S U F F I C I E N T 
AS A M A T T E R OF L A W SO AS TO 
D E N Y H E R A N Y CLAIM O F R I G H T 
U N D E R T H E D E L I N Q U E N T U N I -
FORM R E A L E S T A T E CONTRACT. 
In the findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R-106-112) the District Court set forth two conclu-
sions of law as follows: 
1. That the counterclaim of the defendant, 
Ann F . Olsen, in behalf of herself, and as an 
assignee of Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, Inc., 
should be denied for the resason that the tender 
made in payment in full of the contract, was 
insufficient in law. 
2. That at the time that Rocking 0 ' Horse 
Trailers, Inc. executed its assignment, of the 
contract rights set forth in the said Uniform 
Real Estate Contract to the defendant, Ann 
F . Olsen, which contract pertained to the sub-
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ject premises, that title to said real estate and 
the corporation's interest in said Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, had been vested in the trustee 
in bankruptcy by virtue of the corporation 
bankruptcy proceedings, and that thereafter 
the corporation had nothing to assign and the 
effect of the assignment was null and void, and 
that by reason of the foregoing the defendant, 
Ann F . Olsen, and Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, 
Inc., her assignor, have no interest in subject 
property. 
The tender made by the appellant, Ann F , Olsen 
was insufficient as a matter of law. Ann F . Olsen pre-
sented respondents with a check purporting to be pay-
ment in full under the terms of the contract between 
her assignor and the fee title holder, respondents assign-
or. There was not sufficient funds in the bank to pay 
the check (TR-3, 7). Further, the check did not take 
into account delinquent taxes, attorney's fees, and im-
provements made upon the premises by the respondents 
(TR-37). 
The check was delivered on condition that the re-
spondents first provide appellant Ann F . Olsen with 
a deed and a title insurance policy (TR-16). The con-
tract to which the parties are subject did not require 
delivery of a deed as a condition precedent to payment 
in full (R-55-56). Further the choice of providing the 
appellant with title insurance or an abstract to date 
after payment in full by appellant was at the election 
of the respondents not the appellants (R-55-56). 
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Tender is defined in the case of Somerton State 
Bank v. Maccey, 22 Arizona 365, 197 P892, 14 A L R 
1117 as an offer to pay money, coupled with a present 
ability so to do; it imports not merely readiness and 
ability to pay at the time and place specified in the con-
tract but actual production of the money to be paid. 
The requirement of a present ability to make good 
the offer is indispensable to give the offer the legal effect 
of a tender, Bembridge v. Miller, 235 Ar. 396, 385 P.2d 
1972. 
The amount offered by the debtor to his creditor 
must be at least equal to the whole amount due and an 
offer of part of the amount due is not a valid tender. 
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Boothe, 160 Ari-
zona 679, 86 P.2d 960. 
A tender must include everything to which the 
creditor is entitled, and a tender of anything less is not 
a tender at all. I t must include interest, costs and at-
torney's fees to which the creditor has become entitled 
by force of the agreement of the parties or by com-
mencement of suit. Colby v. Reed, 99 US 560, 25 L Ed 
484; River Valley Cartage Co. v. Hawkeye. Secur. Ins. 
Co. 17 111. 2d 242, 161 N E 2d 101, 76 A L R 2d 978. 
I t is the duty of the debtor to make sure his tender 
is sufficient in amount. He acts at his peril and m u s t 
see to it that his tender is sufficient in amount and any 
delinquency in amount is at his peril. Wood v. Howland, 
127 Iowa 394, l(I! N W 756; Greenwade v. Williams 
(KY) 281 SW 2d 707. 
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I t is a well accepted rule that a tender upon a con-
dition for which there is no foundation in the contract 
is insufficient. A tender must be without conditions to 
which the creditor can have a valid objection or which 
will be prejudicial to his rights. Bohler v. Calloway, 267 
US 479, 69 L Ed 745, 45 S Ct 431; Bellamah v. Schni-
der, 68 NM 247, 360 P.2d 656. 
From the facts as they were stipulated to in the 
transcript and from a review of the cases cited, supra, 
it appears that the attempted tender of the appellant 
Ann F . Olsen, was insufficient as a matter of law in 
the following particulars: 
(1) The appellant did not have the present 
ability to pay; (TR-3) 
(2) The tender was for less than the amount 
due by the terms of contract; (TR-3) 
(3) The tender was conditioned upon de-
livery of a deed prior to payment, (TR-3) 
and 
(4) The tender was conditioned upon deliv-
ery of a title policy (TR-16) thus denying 
respondent his contractural right to choose 
between a title policy or an abstract brought 
to date. (R-55-56) 
P O I N T I I 
T I T L E TO T H E S U B J E C T P R O P E R -
TY W A S V E S T E D I N T H E T R U S T E E 
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I N B A N K R U P T C Y A N D T H E R E -
F O R E ROCKING O' H O R S E T R A I L -
ERS , INC., H A D NO T I T L E TO CON-
V E Y TO T H E A P P E L L A N T , ANN F . 
OLSEN. 
When Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, Inc. filed its 
petition in Bankruptcy and the trustee was appointed, 
the estate belonging to the bankrupt corporation vested 
in the trustee. Acme Harvester Co. v. Beckman Lumber 
Co., 222 US 300, 566 Ed 208,32 S Ct. 96. 
When the trustee, subject to the order of the court, 
returned the property to the Internal Revenue Service 
it did so in order to allow the Internal Revenue Service 
to proceed with its levy. The order of the court was not 
an abandonment. 
The order specifically required the trustee to re-
turn the subject property to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice and to "execute all documents necessary, if any, 
to make the transfer..." (R-83) 
If indeed the transfer is to be considered an aban-
donment, it was an abandonment to a specific creditor 
and not an abandonment to the bankrupt. California 
Joint Stock Land Bank of San Francisco v. Gore, 
(Oregon) 55 P.2d 1118. 
This then, in effect, was not an abandonment by 
the trustee but a transfer of the subject property. When 
the Internal Revenue Service later failed to take action, 
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title to the property reverted to the trustee in Bank-
ruptcy. 
The fact that the Bankruptcy proceedings were 
closed without abandonment by the trustee does not 
have the effect of revesting title in the bankrupt, since 
it is not equivalent to an order of abandonment. Stano-
lind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F2d 28, Cert, denied 
302 US 763, 82 L. Ed. 592, 58 S Ct 409, 303 US 636, 
82 L Ed 1097, 58 Ct 522. 
The effort of the defunct corporation (TR-4, R-
6, 7) to convey the property was an abortive effort. The 
corporation having had its charter suspended had no 
power or authority to perform a corporate act, i.e., con-
vey real property, 59-13-16 UCA 1953, as amended, 
16-10-88.5 UCA 1953, as amended. 
POINT III 
T H E A P P E L L A N T S A B A N D O N E D 
T H E I R I N T E R E S T I N T H E SUB-
J E C T P R O P E R T Y 
The appellants defaulted in making the required 
contractual payment for approximately five years (TR-
12). During this same period of time the appellants 
were not in possession of the property nor did they 
assert any claim to the property and they made no 
payment of real property taxes assessed against the 
property (R-110). 
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Generally the doctrine of abandonment of title 
to property does not apply to real property. If an in-
dividual has a perfect legal title thereto, title remains 
vested in that individual until it passes by grant, des-
cent, adverse possession or some other operation of law. 
However, in the case of a vendor's interest in a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract the title is an unperformed equi-
table title and as such it is subject to abandonment. Hull 
V. demons, 200 Or 533, 567 P2d 225. 
From the facts, as outlined above, it appears clear 
that the appellants abandoned the property here in 
question. Any one of the above facts might not be suffi-
cient to constitute an abandonment but cumulatively 
they constitute the elements of abandonment. 
In the case of Melco Investment Company v. Gapp, 
259 Minn. 82, 105 N W 2d 970, the court held: 
Abandonment has been defined as a vol-
untary relinquishment of an interest by the 
owner with the intent of terminating his owner-
ship. The intent may be shown by conduct. 
Mere failure to pay the purchase price under 
a real estate contract does not, in itself, consti-
tute an abandonment. There must be other 
circumstances present, such as, for instance, 
a lengthy lapse of time, in order that the intent 
to abandon may properly be inferred. 
I t appears that the combined circumstances in the 
case at hand are so decisive that the subject property 
should be considered abandoned as a matter of law. 
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Collins v. Collins, 348 Mich, 320, 82 N W 2d 213, 68 
ACR 2d 575. 
In their brief on appeal, the appellants lay great 
stress on the fact that respondents failed to give the 
appellants notice of termination as required by the con-
tract. I t is true that in the normal situation, a vendor 
would give notive to the vendee. However, in this case, 
it was impossible for the respondents to give notice to 
the appellants because their whereabouts was unknown 
(TR-18 R-6, 7). The vendee entitled to notice was the 
defunct bankrupt corporation, Rocking 'O' Horse Trail-
ers, Inc. (No notice of the conveyance from the corpora-
tion Rocking 0 ' Horse Trailers, Inc. to Ann F . Olsen 
having been given to the respondents. The corporation 
Ricking 'O' Horse Trailers, Inc.'s last known principal 
place of business, the officers and directors last known 
address, and the registered agents address, were all the 
same, that is, the address of the subject property (TR-
18 R-6, 7). The respondents were in possession of the 
property (R-110) and the appellants left no forwarding 
address as the District Court learned in attempting to 
mail the appellant Ronald L. Olsen and Rocking 'O' 
Horse Trailers, Inc. a copy of the summons. (R-13-14-
22 ). The law does not require the performance of a 
useless act, and the sending of notice based on the facts 
of this case would have been such an act. While the 
whereabouts of the appellants was unknown to the re-
spondents or their grantor, Georgina Clark, (R-6-7 
TR-18) the reverse was not true, the respondents were 
openly in possession of the property and Georgina Clark 
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had not moved from the location where the appellants 
had previously made their payments. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should affirm the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court. I t is clear, as a matter of law, that the 
appellants have no interest in the subject property and 
therefore have no standing to contest the judgment of 
the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F U L L M E R & H A R D I N G 
540 East Fifth South Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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